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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Micl1elle McIntosh was charged with two counts of trafficking in 
methamphetamine, two counts of delivery of methamphetamine, and one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and she proceeded to trial. At the close of the 
State's case, the district court dismissed one of the trafficking charges, and instead 
instructed the jury that she may be found guilty of possession with the intent to deliver. 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. 
Ms. McIntosh asserts that, because possession with the intent to deliver is not a 
lesser included offense of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession, the district 
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the possession with the intent to deliver 
allegation, and this Court must vacate her conviction on that charge. Furthermore, 
Ms. McIntosh asserts that her total unified sentence of 10 years, with 4 years fixed, is 
excessive in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
An Ada County grand jury indicted Michelle McIntosh on two counts of trafficking 
in methamphetamine (one count by possession of 28 or more grams, and one count by 
delivery of 28 or more grams), two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, and one 
misdemeanor charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.18-20.) The charges 
arose after her then-boyfriend, out of concern for her wellbeing, informed police that 
Ms. McIntosh was dealing methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.3-4.) 
An undercover police officer made three separate purchases of 
methamphetamine from Ms. McIntosh: one-eighth of an ounce (Count IV, delivery); one-
half ounce a week later (Count Ill, delivery); and, one full ounce eight days after that 
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(Count II, trafficking by delivery). (PSI, p.3; see also Tr. 12/2/13, p.181, L.4 - p.257, 
L.20; Tr. 12/3/13, p.28, L.1 - p.158, L.17 (testimony of Det. Coy Brunner).) 
Ms. McIntosh was arrested shortly after the third sale, and additional methamphetamine 
(Count I, trafficking by possession), and a pipe (Count V, possession of drug 
paraphernalia) were found on her. (Tr. 12/3/13, p.195, L. 7 -- p.202, L.24.) 
At the close of the State's case, Ms. McIntosh's counsel moved the court to 
"partially dismiss count one or dismiss the trafficking component of count one and just 
leave simple possession of a controlled substance." (Tr. 12/4/13, p.408, Ls. 7-17.) After 
considering the arguments of both parties (Tr. 12/4/13, p.408, L:1 ·1 - p.428, L. '16), the 
district court "dismissed" the trafficking charge in Count I and ruled that it would instead 
instruct the jury on possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver 
(Tr. 12/4/13, p.436, L.18 - p.437, L.17). The jury found Ms. McIntosh guilty of all 
charges. (R., pp.133-136.) 
During the sentencing hearing, the State cited to the fact that Ms. McIntosh took 
her case to trial, and the "cost that that put on the rest of the community, jurors, this 
court, the state," and requested that the district court impose a total unified sentence of 
19 years, with four and one-half years fixed. (Tr. 1/21/14, p.517, L.22 - p.523, L.25.) 
Counsel for Ms. McIntosh requested that the court impose a total unified sentence of 5 
years, with the mandatory minimum 3 years of fixed time. (Tr. 1/21/14, p.529, Ls.1-7.) 
The district court sentenced Ms. McIntosh to a unified term of 6 years, with 2 years 
fixed, 1 on the possession with intent to deliver charge, a unified term of 10 years, with 4 
years fixed, on the trafficking charge, unified terms of 7 years, with 2 years fixed, and 8 
1 The Judgment of Conviction and Commitment erroneously states that Ms. McIntosh 
was convicted in Count I of trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., p.139.) This 
scrivener's error may be corrected through Idaho Criminal Rule 36. 
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years 3 fixed, respectively on the delivery charges, and 240 days in jail on the 
possession of drug paraphernalia charge, with all sentences to run concurrently, for a 
total unified term of 10 years, with 4 years fixed. (R., pp.138-143; Tr. 1/21/14, p.536, 
L.21 - p.538, L.13.) Ms. McIntosh filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.152-154.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Should this Court vacate Ms. McIntosh's conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to deliver, as the district court did not have subject-
matter jurisdiction over that charge? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Ms. McIntosh a 
total unified term of 10 years, with 4 years fixed, in light of the mitigating factors 




This Court Should Vacate Ms. Mcintosh's Conviction For Possession Of A Controlled 
Substance With The Intent To Deliver, As The District Court Did Not Have Subject-
Matter Jurisdiction Over That Charge 
A. Introduction 
Ms. McIntosh was charged in Count I with trafficking in methamphetamine by 
possession of 28 grams or more. The district court dismissed that charge and 
instructed the jury that they could find Ms. McIntosh guilty of possession of 
methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, and the jury found her guilty of that charge. 
Because possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver is not a lesser 
included charge of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession, the district court 
lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction to allow the jury to convict Ms. McIntosh of 
possession with the intent to deliver. As such, this Court must vacate Ms. McIntosh's 
conviction for that charge. 
B. This Court Must Vacate Ms. McIntosh's Conviction For Possession Of A 
Controlled Substance With The Intent To Deliver As The District Court Did Not 
Have Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over That Charge 
Whether or not a district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction is an issue that 
can be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 832 (2011) 
(citing State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 (2004)). A district court gains subject-matter 
jurisdiction over a felony charge only where that crime is alleged in an Information or 
Indictment, or where a crime is a lesser included offense of a crime charged in an 
Information or Indictment. State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 526-527 (2011 ). 
Ms. McIntosh was charged in Count I of the Indictment with trafficking in 
methamphetamine by possession of 28 grams or more. (R., pp.18-19.) As such, the 
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district court only had subject-matter jurisdiction over a charge of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to deliver, if that charge is a lesser included offense 
of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession of 28 grams or more, as alleged in 
Count I of the Indictment. 
"'The determination of whether a particular crime is an included offense of the 
crime charged involves a question of law over which [an appellate] Court exercises free 
review."' Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527 (quoting State v. Rosencrantz, 130 Idaho 666, 668 
(1997)). Idaho Courts analyze whether a crime is an included offense of another crime 
under two theories: the "statutory theory" or the "pleading theory." Id. (citations 
omitted). As will be demonstrated below, under either of these theories, possession of 
a controlled substance with the intent to deliver is not a lesser included offense of 
trafficking in methamphetamine by possession of 28 grams or more. Therefore, the 
district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to deliver allegation that Ms. McIntosh was convicted of in 
Count I, and this Court must vacate that conviction. 
1. Under The Statutory Theory, Possession Of A Controlled Substance With 
The Intent To Deliver Is Not A Lesser Included Offense Of Trafficking In 
Methamphetamine 
Idaho Courts apply the Blockburge? test to determine whether a crime is a lesser 
included offense of another under the "statutory theory." Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527. 
"'Under this theory, one offense is not considered a lesser included of another unless it 
is necessarily so under the statutory definition of the crime."' Id. (quoting State v. 
Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433 (1980)). "'An offense will be deemed to be a lesser 
2 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
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included offense of another, greater offense, if all the elements required to sustain a 
conviction of the lesser included offense are included within the elements needed to 
sustain a conviction of the greater offense."' Id. ( quoting State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 
111, 114 (1979)). The Flegel Court determined, "Sexual abuse of a child under the age 
of sixteen could not be a lesser included offense of Lewd Conduct under the statutory 
theory because it was possible to cornmit Lewd Conduct without committing Sexual 
Abuse." Id. 151 Idaho at 529.) 
In the present case, because under Idaho law it is possible to commit trafficking 
in methamphetamine without committing possession of a controlled substance with the 
intent to deliver, the latter is not a lesser included offense of the former. Idaho Code § 
37-2732B(a)(4 )(A) reads, in relevant part, ilS follows, 
Any person who knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or who 
is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) 
grams or more of methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any mixture or 
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or 
amphetamine is guilty of a felony, which felony shall be known as 
"trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine." 
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4) (emphasis added). The subsequent subsections delineate 
different penalties, both required and authorized, based upon the amount of 
methamphetamine the person traffics. 
Idaho Code§ 37-2732(a) states, "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture or 
deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." 
I.C. § 37-2732(a). The subsequent subsections delineate the penalties that are 
authorized depending upon the type of controlled substance the person manufactures, 
delivers, or has the intent to manufacture or deliver. I.C. § 37-2732. 
By the plain language of these statutes, possession with the intent to deliver 
cannot be a lesser included offense of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession, 
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because it is possible to commit the crime of trafficking by possession without 
committing the crime of possession with the intent to deliver. One may possess 28 
grams of methamphetamine without having the intent to deliver that methamphetamine 
to another. Alternatively, one may possess less than 28 grams of methamphetamine 
with the intent to deliver it to another, without violating the trafficking statute. Thus, a 
free review of the statutes involved reveals that possession of a controlled substance 
with the intent to deliver is not a lesser included offense of trafficking in 
methamphetamine by possession of 28 grams or more, under the "statutory theory." 
2. Under The Pleading Theory, Possession Of A Controlled Substance With 
The Intent To Deliver Is Not A Lesser Included Offense Of Trafficking In 
Methamphetamine 
The pleading '"theory holds "that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged 
in the information [or indictment] as a means or element of the commission of the higher 
offense.""' Flegel, 151 Idaho at 529 (quoting Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211 
(1986) (in turn quoting State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 301 (1960)).) The Indictment 
alleged in Count I that Ms. McIntosh committed trafficking in metharnphetamine as 
follows: 
That the Defendant, MICHELLE FAYE MCINTOSH, on or about the 29th 
day of May, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did knowingly 
possess Methamphetamine, to-wit: twenty-eight (28) grams or more of 
Methamphetamine, a Schedule 11 controlled substance, or of any mixture 
or substance containing a detectable amount of Methamphetamine. 
(R., pp.18-19.). Among other elements, the jury was specifically instructed that in order 
to find Ms. McIntosh guilty of possession with the intent to deliver, they must find that 
she "intended to deliver that substance to another." (R., p.100.) 
Because the grand jury did not allege in Count I of the Indictment (as opposed to 
Count II (see R., p.19)), that Ms. McIntosh committed the crime of trafficking in 
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methamphetamine under the theory that she "delivered" the substance to another, the 
State did not allege possession of metharnphetamine with the "intent to deliver" as a 
means of committing the crime charged Count I. Thus, a free review of both Count I of 
the Indictment filed, and the relevant jury instruction, reveals that possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to deliver, is not a lesser included offense of 
trafficking in methamphetarnine as charged in Count I, under the "pleading theory." 
C. Because The District Court Lacked The Subject-Matter ,Jurisdiction Necessary To 
Instruct The Jury On Possession Of A Controlled Substance With The Intent To 
Deliver, This Court Must Vacate Ms. McIntosh's Conviction In Count I 
As demonstrated above, the district court lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction 
necessary to instruct the jury that they could find Ms. McIntosh guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to deliver, in Count I. Where a conviction is based 
on a charge over which the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court 
must vacate the conviction. See Flegel, 151 Idaho at 531; see also State v. Lute, 150 
Idaho 837, 841 (2011 ). Therefore, this Court must vacate Mr. McIntosh's conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Ms. McIntosh A Total 
Unified Term Of 10 Years, With 4 Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That 
Exist In Her Case 
A Introduction 
Ms. McIntosh asserts that, in light of her acceptance of responsibility, her 
remorse, her drug addiction and willingness to seek treatment, and the support she 
receives from her family, the district court imposed an excessive sentence. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Ms. McIntosh A 
Total Unified Tern1 Of 10 Years, With 4 Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating 
Factors That Exist In Her Case 
Ms. McIntosh asserts that, given any view of the facts, her total unified sentence 
of 10 years, with 4 years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. McIntosh does not allege that 
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Ms. McIntosh must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. 
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 
121 Idaho 385 (1992))). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: 
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting 
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001 ))). 
Ms. McIntosh conceded during her opening statement that she was guilty of 
various drug crimes - she challenged only the claims made in Counts I and that the 
amount of methamphetamine that she possessed and delivered reached the 28-gram 
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threshold necessary to support trafficking charges. (Tr. 12i2i13, p.176, L.22 - p.180, 
L.16.) She readily admitted in her PSI questionnaire that she sold drugs to support her 
drug habit. (PSI, p.3.) She had been using methamphetamine on a daily basis for the 6 
months leading up to her arrest and she did not hold any ill feelings towards her 
boyfriend who helped arrange the controlled buys, recognizing that he "had 'good 
intentions' to help her get 'clean."' (PSI, p.4.) She completed some drug treatment 
programming while in the county jail and noted that she was open to more treatment, 
acknowledging that she has a drug problem. (PSI, p.13.) 
Ms. McIntosh wrote a letter to the district court stating that her drug abuse not 
only had a huge effect on her personally, but also "emotionally harmed" those she 
loved. (PSI, p.153.) She expressed that she feit shame for what she did, and took 
responsibility for her actions. (PSI, p.153.) Even though she knew the court was 
required to send her to prison, she felt grateful for what had happened, recognizing that 
she was on a bad path, and she expressed a desire to use her time in prison to become 
a better person. (PSI, pp.153-154.) Ms. McIntosh enjoys the support of family and 
friends. Her sister, Bianca Cota, her aunt, Penny Abel, and her step-sister, Tashina 
Flappingeagle, all wrote letters in support describing positive aspects of her character. 
(PSI, pp.96-98.) 
Idaho Courts recognize that acceptance of responsibility, remorse, drug addiction 
and the willingness to seek treatment, and support from family and friends, are all 
mitigating factors that should counsel towards a lesser sentence. See State v. Nice, 
103 Idaho 89 (1982); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 
Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. James, 112 Idaho 239 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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Ms. McIntosh asserts that, in light of the above-mitigating factors, the district couri 
imposed an excessive sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. McIntosh respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction for 
possession with the intent to deliver, and further requests that this Court reduce her 
total sentence to a unified term of 5 years, with 3 years fixed, as requested by her trial 
counsel. 
DATED this 28 th day of April, 2015. 
eputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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